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NOTES 
ASSET FORFEITURE AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES:  
THE ZERO-SUM GAME  
Adam R. Cohen* 
 
The history of asset forfeiture law spans almost as long as the history of 
the United States.  However, in the last thirty years, the number of crimes for 
which asset forfeiture can be levied has grown exponentially both on the 
federal and state levels.  As a result, a growing number of defendants face 
asset forfeiture. 
When these criminal defendants seek legal representation, they place their 
attorneys in a difficult legal and ethical position.  Asset forfeiture has 
developed in such a way that the criminal defense attorney cannot provide 
her client with zealous advocacy if the attorney seeks to retain her fees.  
Additionally, the law is designed to prevent these attorneys from withdrawing 
their representation once they learn that the funds being used to pay their 
fees are tainted. 
This Note examines these, and other, ethical dilemmas that arise for 
criminal defense attorneys whose clients may be subject to asset forfeiture.  
Ultimately, this Note proposes a statutory fix to resolve these ethical issues 
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INTRODUCTION 
A repeat client comes into your office and notifies you that he is being 
investigated for insider trading.  You, as his potential legal representative, are 
placed in an ethical bind in which the client’s interests are pitted against your 
own.  Your desire to retain your own legal fees impinges upon your ability 
to zealously represent your client because of the presence of asset forfeiture 
laws. 
An attorney has an ethical and legal responsibility to zealously represent 
her client.1  She “owes a duty of care [and] must exercise the competence and 
diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.”2  This 
diligence includes conducting a complete and thorough investigation into the 
facts and circumstances surrounding each case.3  Ultimately, this 
investigation will lead to the discovery of material facts which can, and 
should, be used to impeach and create reasonable doubt as to the 
prosecution’s case.  Material facts discovered through the attorney’s 
investigation are central to the decision-making of the client and the defense 
attorney with regards to plea and proffer agreements, trial strategies, and 
sentencing.  Thus, to zealously represent a client, a defense attorney must 
devote significant time and resources investigating the underlying facts of a 
client’s indictment. 
Since the 1980s, Congress and many states have expanded the use of 
criminal asset forfeiture for crimes, including insider trading.4  
 
 1. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713, 725 (Ct. App. 1974) (“The duty of a 
lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously [w]ithin 
the bounds of the law.”); Schunk v. Zeff & Zeff, P.C., 311 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1981) (citing Friedman v. Dozorc, 268 N.W.2d 673 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)) (holding that “an 
attorney has a duty to be a zealous advocate” and that this obligation to the client “permits the 
lawyer to assert that view of the law most favorable to the client”); LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 
970 A.2d 1007, 1013 (N.J. 2009) (“[T]he attorney’s primary duty is to be a zealous advocate 
for his or her own client.”). 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 3. Id. § 52 cmt. (c). 
 4. Congress has discovered a somewhat confusing means to enable courts to order asset 
forfeiture for insider trading offenses.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), a court may order 
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Unfortunately, these asset-forfeiture laws clash with the attorney’s ability to 
conduct investigations necessary to fulfill her responsibility to be a zealous 
advocate.  Criminal asset forfeiture statutes only allow an attorney to collect 
fees where she is “reasonably without cause to believe that the property was 
subject to forfeiture.”5  Accordingly, an attorney must avoid learning that the 
funds being used to pay her legal fees stem from an illegal source. 
The conflicting need to conduct a thorough investigation and to remain in 
the dark about a client’s funds puts an attorney in a difficult situation.  On the 
one hand, an attorney who conducts a full and complete investigation risks 
losing fees because she may develop cause to believe that the property used 
to pay her will be subject to forfeiture.  On the other hand, an attorney who 
does not conduct a full investigation may be able to recoup all of her legal 
fees, but she could face disciplinary action, including potential disbarment, 
for failing to act as a zealous advocate.6  Thus, in cases in which an attorney 
represents a client charged with a crime where asset forfeiture can be levied, 
the attorney must walk a fine line to be compensated for her service.  In 
essence, the law incentivizes attorneys to inadequately represent their clients 
in order to recoup legal fees. 
Mens rea crimes, like insider trading, complicate the inherent tension 
between performing due diligence and making sure one’s fees will not be 
subject to asset forfeiture.  In insider trading cases, there is often little doubt 
as to whether a trade occurred—one way or another, an individual received 
a windfall of cash by making either a wise or illegal decision.  Often, the only 
question for a jury is whether or not the defendant acted with scienter.7  If the 
decision was made in willful violation of securities laws, the trade is illegal 
 
forfeiture for “any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’” as defined in 
§ 1956(c)(7). 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2012).  Section 1956(c)(7)(A) incorporates “any act 
or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1).” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (2012).  
Section 1961(1)(D) lists “any offense involving . . . fraud in the sale of securities.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1)(D) (2012).  Insider trading is one such crime. See United States v. Contorinis, 692 
F.3d 136, 145 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2012). 
 6. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 80 
(4th ed. 2010). 
 7. Liability for securities fraud requires evidence that the defendant “acted with 
scienter.” United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014).  Scienter is defined as 
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).  To establish a criminal violation of the securities 
laws, the government must show that the defendant acted “willfully.” 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) 
(2012).  Willfully is defined as “a realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a 
wrongful act under the securities laws.” United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 
2005) (citing United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970)); see also Peter J. Henning, 
There Are No Perry Mason Moments in Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/business/dealbook/insider-trading-cases-proof.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5WN-STST] (noting that white collar prosecutions are difficult because 
white collar crimes “are quintessentially offenses of the mind, revolving around intent and 
knowledge” where “no one disputes what happened while everything depends on what the 
defendant understood and intended”).  For a discussion of additional problems with insider 
trading law, see Austin Green, Note, (Beyond) Family Ties:  Remote Tippees in a Post-Salman 
Era, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2773 (2017). 
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and the funds are tainted.8  If the decision was not made in willful violation, 
the trade is legal and the funds are clean.  In these situations, it is imperative 
for a defense attorney to conduct a full investigation to determine where the 
information came from and how likely it is that the government will be able 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with scienter.  It 
is only through a detailed investigation that an attorney can know how her 
client will fare in front of a jury or in plea negotiations. 
An attorney may be able to successfully and ethically use “avoidance 
techniques” to refrain from discovering whether her client acted with scienter 
and whether the funds were tainted.9  Unfortunately, the law imposes yet 
another obstacle to defense counsels’ receipt of payment—they must conduct 
a separate investigation into the source of fees.  This investigation, referred 
to as a Moffitt investigation,10 requires that an attorney ask her client direct 
questions about the source and cleanliness of the client’s funds.11  The 
attorney is also obligated to take additional steps to verify that her client’s 
answers are objectively reasonable.12  Often, if not always, the Moffitt 
investigation is in direct conflict with an attorney’s duties and responsibilities 
in her fact-finding investigation because it restricts an attorney’s ability to 
develop an alternate theory of the case and drastically limits, if not eliminates, 
her ability to carry out her duty of zealous representation.13 
This Note explores the ethical dilemmas an attorney confronts when 
representing a client who may face asset forfeiture.  Part I of this Note 
examines asset forfeiture law and the professional and ethical duties an 
attorney owes her client.  It also describes the interplay between these two 
areas of law.  Next, Part II discusses three instances when, while trying to 
protect her source of income, an attorney may feel compelled to violate the 
ethical duties she owes to her client.  These instances include the initial fact-
finding investigation, any motion to withdraw from the case, and the ancillary 
hearing to keep funds.14  Finally, Part III proposes a statutory fix to help 
attorneys keep their funds, while encouraging them to represent clients with 
potentially tainted assets. 
 
 8. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447.  For the purposes of this Note, the term “tainted” means 
“any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or 
indirectly, as the result of” the commission of a crime. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). 
 9. Defense attorneys often engage in “avoidance techniques” to prevent learning too 
many damaging facts from clients.  These “avoidance techniques” provide defense attorneys 
with leeway to compose and articulate different strategies to better serve the client.  See infra 
Part II.A  
 10. See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Va. 1994), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 11. See id.; see also infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 12. See In re Moffitt, 846 F. Supp. at 474. 
 13. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 14. The ancillary hearing provides attorneys with an opportunity to challenge the 
forfeiture by establishing a legitimate right to the property. See infra note 64 and 
accompanying text.  
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I.  ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS AND THE 
ETHICAL DUTIES OWED BY ATTORNEYS 
A lawyer representing a client whose assets may be subject to forfeiture 
faces an ethical dilemma.  Part I.A introduces the various duties that an 
attorney owes to her client.  Then, Part I.B outlines current asset forfeiture 
law and the procedure that third parties can use to secure property subject to 
forfeiture to which the party has a legitimate right.  It goes on to discuss the 
bona fide purchaser exception to asset forfeiture—the most common and 
practical means an attorney can employ to secure her fees.  Finally, this 
section synthesizes various court decisions into a comprehensible black letter 
rule of law. 
A.  The Attorney’s Professional Duties to Her Client 
The law imposes a number of legal and ethical duties upon defense 
attorneys.  This Part discusses three duties pertinent to asset forfeiture cases.  
Part I.A.1 discusses the duty of zealous advocacy.  Next, Part I.A.2 explains 
the duty to maintain client confidences.  Finally, Part I.A.3 outlines personal 
conflicts of interest. 
1.  The Duty of Zealous Advocacy 
First and foremost, a lawyer has a duty to act as a zealous representative 
of her client.15  This duty stems from the obligation to give “entire devotion 
to the interest of [her] client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of 
his rights and the exertion of utmost learning and ability.”16  Because the 
client has a right to autonomy and to decide what his interests are,17 zeal 
refers to the “dedication with which the lawyer furthers the client’s 
interests.”18  Historically, this dedication required the lawyer to consider only 
the wants, needs, and goals of her client.19  Accordingly, it is the lawyer’s 
duty to exercise discretion and to “urge any permissible construction of the 
law favorable to [her] client . . . if the position . . . is supportable by a good 
faith argument.”20 
There are, of course, limits to the duty of zealous advocacy.  The Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility addresses such limitations.21  Canon 7 
of the Code dictates that “[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously 
 
 15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 16. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 68 (citing A.B.A. CANNONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15 (1908)). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE:  PART II 3 (James Cockcroft & Co. 1874) (“[A]n 
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person 
is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to 
others persons, and amongst them to himself, is his first and only duty.”); L. Ray Patterson, 
Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 918 (1980) (“The 
prevailing notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client is 
the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only duty of the lawyer.”). 
 20. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 21. See generally id. 
168 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
within the bounds of the law”22 because the lawyer owes the duty of zeal not 
only to individual clients but to the legal system itself.23  Thus, while the 
lawyer owes a duty to achieve the client’s goals, such goals must be permitted 
by law. 
A lawyer may be professionally disciplined for providing her client with 
less than zealous representation.24  Pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 
7-101(A)(1) of the Code, a lawyer “shall not intentionally . . . [f]ail to seek 
the lawful objectives of [her] client through reasonably available means 
permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.”25  The affirmative duties 
imposed by asset forfeiture law greatly increase the likelihood that a defense 
attorney will face disciplinary action for violating the duty of zealous 
advocacy.26 
2.  The Duty to Maintain Client Confidences 
Related to the attorney’s duty of loyalty and zealousness is the duty to 
maintain client confidences.  An attorney will be unable to represent her 
client with zeal unless she knows the facts of the case.  Ordinarily, many facts 
can only be obtained from the client.  In theory, a client will only reveal 
sensitive facts if he can be assured that his confidences will not be shared 
with others.27  Trust between a lawyer and her client is the “cornerstone of 
the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel.”28 
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbids an attorney 
from disclosing information relating to the representation of a client unless:  
the client gives informed consent, disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry 
out the representation, or disclosure is permitted by one of a number of 
exceptions.29 
 
 22. Id. Canon 7. 
 23. Id. EC 7-1; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“Although counsel 
must take all reasonable lawful means to attain the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded 
from taking steps or in any way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise 
violating the law.”). 
 24. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 80; see, e.g., People v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 
339, 342 (Colo. 1989) (disbarring an attorney for violating DR 7-101(A)(1) of the Code); Iowa 
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Maxwell, 705 N.W.2d 477, 480–81 (Iowa 2005) 
(suspending an attorney for at least one year for, among other things, violating DR 7-101(A)(1) 
of the Code); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 528 A.2d 895, 904 (Md. 1987) 
(suspending an attorney for six months for violating DR 7-101(A)(1) of the Code); In re Breen, 
552 A.2d 105, 112 (N.J. 1989) (permanently disbarring attorney where, among other things, 
the attorney “failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client” 
for at least two clients). 
 25. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1). 
 26. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 129–32.  
 28. Id. at 128 (quoting Linton v. Perrini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981)).  
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); id. r. 1.6(b)(5) 
cmt. 11.  The Model Rules allow attorneys to disclose information to (1) prevent reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm, (2) prevent the client from committing a crime or 
fraud, (3) prevent substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, (4) secure 
legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with the Rules, (5) collect a fee, (6) comply with 
other law or a court order, or (7) detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Id. 
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Related to but distinct from the duty to maintain client confidences is 
attorney-client privilege,30 which is recognized in every state of the United 
States.31  This privilege protects all communications “relevant to the subject 
matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance”32 and 
“applies even where the information sought to be obtained cannot be 
discovered from any other source.”33  The mode of communication can be 
verbal, written, or nonverbal communication such as signs, acting out scenes, 
or any other form of communicative act.34  This privilege can be waived by 
the client.35 
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes attorney-client 
privilege in Disciplinary Rule 4-101.36  This Rule requires that an attorney 
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.37  The Code defines 
“confidences” as “information protected by the attorney-client privilege 
under applicable law” and “secrets” as “other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the 
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be 
detrimental to the client.”38  An attorney is subject to discipline for violating 
this duty.39  The tension between the duty to keep client confidences and the 
defense attorney’s desires to retain her fees is apparent in the later stages of 
representing a client facing asset forfeiture.40 
3.  The Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest create some of the most frequent and difficult 
problems confronted by attorneys.41  Many scholars have discussed and 
analyzed these conflicts.42  They are an inherent aspect of the human 
 
 30. See Elizabeth Slater, Note, A Legal and Ethical Puzzle:  Defense Counsel as Quasi 
Witness, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1427, 1435 (2016).  
 31. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 242 (1986).  
 32. Id. at 257. 
 33. JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS:  LAW AND LIABILITY 204 (2d ed. 2015).  
 34. See WOLFRAM, supra note 31, at 257.  
 35. Id. at 251; see also BURKOFF, supra note 33, at 219 (“Since the attorney-client 
privilege is the client’s privilege—not the attorney’s—it may be waived by the client or his 
duly authorized representative, expressly, or implicitly through prior disclosure of confidential 
information.”).  
 36. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 65 (7th ed. 2004); see, e.g., Ky. 
Bar Ass’n v. Ward, 467 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Ky. 2015) (suspending an attorney for one year for 
violating DR 4-101); In re Scali, 142 A.D.3d 93, 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (disbarring an 
attorney for, among other things, violating DR 4-101); In re Gugino, 83 A.D.3d 1200, 1200 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (suspending attorney for one year for violating, among other things, 
DR 4-101).  
 40. See infra Part II.C. 
 41. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 261. 
 42. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation:  The Judicial Role, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996); Susan P. Shapiro, Everests of the Mundane:  Conflict of 
Interest in Real-World Legal Practice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2000); Edward D. 
Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles:  Policy and Ethical 
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condition;43 whenever there is a reasonable possibility that an individual will 
be “unable to fulfill all of the legitimate needs or desires of two or more 
people” there is a conflict of interest.44  Conflicts of interest need not cause 
actual harm to create issues; they arise whenever there is a potential for 
harm.45 
The rules governing conflicts of interest are codified in Rules 1.7 through 
1.13 and Rule 1.18 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.46  There are 
many types of conflicts:  conflicts between a client and another present or 
former client; conflicts between a client and a person or group who may be 
paying for the client’s legal assistance; and conflicts between the client and 
the lawyer’s business or personal interests.47 
Rule 1.7 bars an attorney from 
represent[ing] a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict 
of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if . . . there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities . . . [or] by a personal 
interest of the lawyer.48 
The comments to Rule 1.7 note that “[t]he lawyer’s own interests should not 
be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client” because 
where “the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious 
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client 
detached advice.”49 
A lawyer’s ability to effectively represent her client may be compromised 
by her own personal interest when a client’s activities affect her ability to 
receive legal fees.50  While these kinds of conflicts are uncommon,51 there 
are cases in which the attorney’s personal financial interest in her legal fees 
and the client’s interest in zealous representation have led to litigation and 
potential punishment for the attorney.52  Consequently, a defense attorney 
must walk a fine line between her personal interests and the interests of her 
 
Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (1994); Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest 
in the Representation of Children in Dependency Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 (1996). 
 43. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 256. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 11.04 (4th ed. 2015) 
(“[A] conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney-client relationship or the quality of the 
representation is ‘at risk,’ even if no substantive impropriety—such as a breach of 
confidentiality or less than zealous representation—in fact eventuates.”). 
 46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7–.13, 1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); 
ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 85. 
 47. See ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 85. 
 48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7. 
 49. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 10. 
 50. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 262–63 (discussing how legal fees create a 
conflict of interest). 
 51. See id. at 263. 
 52. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 564 (1994). 
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clients.  If she fails to strike the right balance, she can face severe punishment, 
including disbarment.53 
B.  Asset Forfeiture Law 
As early as 1789, Congress “enacted numerous statutes authorizing the 
seizure and forfeiture of ships and cargo involved in customs offenses.”54  
Asset forfeiture laws remained, for the most part, constrained in the realm of 
customs laws for the next 200 years.55  In recent decades, however, 
“Congress ha[s] enacted statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property 
involved in a much wider variety of crimes including counterfeiting, 
gambling, alien smuggling, and drug trafficking.”56  Asset forfeiture 
exploded in 1978 and again in 1984 when Congress amended its drug 
forfeiture statutes to reach the property used to facilitate a crime in addition 
to the proceeds of the offense.57 
By the 1990s, Congress had expanded this authority to include money 
laundering, car-jacking, espionage, child pornography, bank fraud, and most 
“white collar” crimes.58  To date, hundreds of federal criminal offenses have 
forfeiture provisions.59  Additionally, “virtually every state . . . has its own 
body of forfeiture laws.  These statutes allow for the seizure of all manner of 
real and personal property, ranging from a family’s home to a small 
business’s bank account.”60 
The central statute of federal asset forfeiture is 18 U.S.C. § 982, which 
authorizes courts to impose criminal forfeiture on anyone convicted of certain 
crimes including embezzlement, smuggling, counterfeiting, bribery, identity 
theft, and various types of fraud.61  Some crimes are included in the asset-
forfeiture matrix through a maze of statutory cross-referencing.62  In addition 
to enumerating the types of crimes that subject a defendant to a risk of asset 
forfeiture, § 982 incorporates an important procedural method by which 
attorneys can hold onto their fees—the ancillary hearing.63  Part I.B.1 
 
 53. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:  STATUTES AND STANDARDS 
113 (2011 ed. 2011). 
 54. STEFAN D. CASELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2d ed. 2013). 
 55. See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/UT4F-AAR2]. 
 56. CASELLA, supra note 54, at 33.  
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 34. 
 59. John Malcolm, Civil Asset Forfeiture:  When Good Intentions Go Awry, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (July 22, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/testimony/civil-asset-forfeiture-when-good-
intentions-go-awry [https://perma.cc/F4DZ-Y7QU]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)–(b) (2012).  Asset forfeiture can also be levied against many other 
federal crimes. See Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture:  A Royal Pain in the 
Assets, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 49 (2008) (“Not all crimes are covered by § 982; 
many criminal statutes have forfeiture provisions of their own, including all federal drug 
felonies, certain crimes involving child pornography, and . . . activities prohibited by RICO.”). 
 62. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) (“The forfeiture of property under this section, including any 
seizure and disposition of the property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, 
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explains how third parties can challenge forfeiture through the ancillary 
hearing.  Then, Part I.B.2 describes the exceptions a third party can prove to 
secure property subject to forfeiture to which the party has a legitimate right.   
1.  The Ancillary Hearing 
Third parties can challenge forfeiture by establishing a legitimate right to 
property through an ancillary hearing.64  The rules of the ancillary hearing 
are outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).65  First, the government must publish the 
entry of an order for forfeiture obtained after the conviction of a criminal.66  
Potential claimants then have thirty days to petition the court for a hearing to 
adjudicate the petitioner’s interest in the property.67  This petition must be 
signed by the petitioner and set forth specific facts alleging the nature and 
extent of the interest and rights in the property.68  The statute sets a timeline 
for the hearing to occur “within 30 days of the filing of the petition” but “that 
is not always feasible.”69 
At the hearing, the petitioner has the right to testify and present evidence 
and witnesses on his own behalf and may cross-examine the government’s 
witnesses who appear at the hearing.70  Under § 853(c), the government also 
has the right to present evidence, examine witnesses, and cross-examine the 
petitioner’s witnesses in support of the government’s claim to the property.71  
The petitioner, however, carries the burden of proof and must establish his 
legal interest in the property by a preponderance of the evidence.72 
2.  The Ancillary Hearing Exceptions 
A petitioner may prove legal interest in property subject to asset forfeiture 
by proving either (1) a superior right to the property in question73 or (2) a 
bona fide purchaser exception.74  If the petitioner successfully proves either 
of these exceptions, the court will amend the order of forfeiture accordingly, 
and the petitioner will be allowed to retain the property.75  This Part addresses 
whether attorneys can use these exceptions to retain their legal fees and thus 
avoid conflicts of interest with their clients who might be penalized under 
asset forfeiture laws. 
 
shall be governed by . . . 21 U.S.C. 853.”).  The process and rules of the ancillary hearing are 
outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (2012).  
 64. See DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE:  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 149 (1st ed. 2004). 
 65. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).  
 66. Id. § 853(n)(1). 
 67. Id. § 853(n)(2).  
 68. Id. § 853(n)(3). 
 69. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 64, at 149–50.  
 70. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(5).  
 71. Id. 
 72. United States v. Armstrong, No. 05-130, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2 (E.D. La. June 1, 
2007). 
 73. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). 
 74. Id. § 853(n)(6)(B). 
 75. Id.  
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a.  Superior Right 
Pursuant to § 853(n)(6)(A), the petitioner of an asset must prove that, at 
the time of the commission of the acts that gave rise to the forfeiture of the 
property, he had a superior right to the property.76  This superior right must 
defeat the relation-back doctrine, which states that all property vests in the 
government upon the commission of a criminal offense.77  Courts have found 
a superior right for marital interests,78 bailor interests,79 and secured 
creditors’ lien interests.80  For a criminal defense attorney, establishing a 
right to fees under the superior right exception is nearly impossible because 
“the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is committed, and 
when they come into existence, the Government’s interest under the relation-
back doctrine immediately vests.”81 
 b.  The Bona Fide Purchaser Exception 
The more feasible exception for attorneys to secure earned fees is 
§ 853(n)(6)(B).82  Under this exception, the petitioner must prove that (1) she 
is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property 
and (2) at the time of the bona fide purchase, she was reasonably without 
cause to believe that the property was forfeitable pursuant to one of the 
criminal acts enumerated or alluded to in the statute.83  To successfully claim 
this exception, the petitioner must provide “evidence that the third party gave 
something of value to the defendant in exchange for an interest in the property 
found forfeitable.”84  The petitioner cannot simply prove that he did not have 
actual knowledge that his property was subject to forfeiture.85  Instead, he 
must prove an objectively reasonable lack of knowledge.86 
A white collar criminal defense attorney who wants to retain fees may try 
to ask for an ancillary hearing and claim the bona fide purchaser exception.  
To do so, she must meet the elements of the § 853(n)(6)(B) exception.87  The 
first element is easily met:  she need only provide evidence that she “gave 
something of value to the defendant in exchange for an interest in the property 
 
 76. Id. § 853(n)(6)(A); see also EDGEWORTH, supra note 64, at 152. 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).  
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Schecter, 251 F.3d 490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 81. United States v. Timely, 507 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2007); see United States v. 
Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “§ 853(n)(6)(A) is likely never to 
apply to proceeds of the crime” as proceeds cannot exist before the commission of that crime); 
United States v. Dupree, 919 F. Supp. 2d 254, 269–70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing attorneys’ 
§ 853(n)(6)(A) claim where assignment occurred between one and four years after the illegal 
acts). 
 82. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B). 
 83. Id.; see also United States v. Armstrong, No. 05-130, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2 (E.D. 
La. June 1, 2007). 
 84. Armstrong, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *7–8. 
 87. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B); see also Armstrong, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2. 
174 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
found forfeitable.”88  The services rendered for the defense meet this 
requirement.89 
The difficulty stems from the second element of § 853(n)(6)(B).90  The 
petitioner cannot simply prove that he did not have actual knowledge that the 
property was subject to forfeiture stemming from a criminal act.91  Instead, 
the petitioner must prove that lacking such knowledge was reasonable.92 
Judicial interpretation of the objectively reasonable belief standard for 
defense attorneys has evolved over time.  In Caplin & Drysdale v. United 
States,93 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, so long as an attorney has read 
the indictment and knows that the government is seeking forfeiture of her 
client’s property, she is on notice of the forfeiture and would be unable to 
satisfy the “without cause to believe” requirement.94  Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(2) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government must specify in 
the indictment what property, if any, is subject to forfeiture.95  Accordingly, 
the attorney would be on notice that the funds being used to pay her fees were 
potentially tainted and would lose the protection of the § 853(n)(6)(B) 
reasonableness standard. 
Similarly, in United States v. Timely,96 the Eighth Circuit denied the 
attorney’s bona fide purchaser protection because the defense attorney 
acquired his interest in the tainted funds more than one month after the jury 
indicted his client.97  The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court that 
“the only way a lawyer could be a beneficiary of § 853(n)(6)(B) would be to 
fail to read the indictment of his client.”98 
 
 88. Armstrong, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2. 
 89. See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 472 (E.D. Va. 1994), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 90. Some courts have split the first element of § 853(n)(6)(B) into two elements. Compare 
United States v. Timely, 507 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a 
§ 853(n)(6)(B) defense consists of three elements:  “(1) the claimant has a legal interest in the 
forfeited property; (2) the interest was acquired as a bona fide purchaser for value; and (3) the 
interest was acquired at a time when the claimant was reasonably without cause to believe that 
the property was subject to forfeiture”), with In re Moffitt, 846 F. Supp. at 472 (noting that to 
prevail under § 853(n)(6)(B) a lawyer must establish “(i) that it was a bona fide purchaser for 
value . . . and (ii) that at the time of the purchase, it was ‘reasonably without cause to believe’ 
that the money constituted or was derived from [illegal activities]” (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 
853(n)(6)(B))). 
 91. See Armstrong, 2007 WL 7335173, at *2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
 94. Id. at 633 n.10; see also United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.5 (11th Cir. 
1989) (finding that “[i]t is unlikely that an attorney will ever achieve th[e] status [of a bona 
fide purchaser] since he is the most likely person to appreciate the forfeitability of his client’s 
assets” and that “an attorney retained to defend one whose assets are subject to forfeiture and 
restraint may go uncompensated”). 
 95. Congress eliminated this portion of Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in 2009 because the same language was added to Rule 32.2(a) in 2002. See FED R. CRIM. P. 7 
advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment. 
 96. 507 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 97. Id. at 1131. 
 98. Timely, 507 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 
632 n.9 (1989)). 
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The Supreme Court’s rule that reading the indictment is enough to put the 
defense attorney on notice fails to recognize the complexities of white collar 
defense.  In many white collar cases, attorneys are “frequently retained before 
an indictment has been returned,” and “the relevant allegation in the 
indictment is not the specific asset used to pay the attorney but, instead, a 
generic provision tracking the statutory language of . . . ‘any and all 
properties constituting, or derived from, directly or indirectly, as the result 
of’ some crime.”99  Thus, when a potential client comes into a white collar 
defense attorney’s office, the attorney cannot be expected to know whether a 
client’s funds are tainted or derived from any crime.100 
c.  The Moffitt Investigation 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision to set a high bar for defense 
attorneys attempting to retain fees subject to forfeiture, some circuits have 
adopted an interpretation of the bona fide purchaser exception that adequately 
accounts for the levels of investigation and representation performed by 
defense attorneys prior to their clients’ indictments.  In United States v. 
Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C.,101 the Fourth Circuit held that the 
petitioning law firm was not reasonably without cause to believe that the 
funds paid to it were subject to forfeiture where it knew the client was the 
subject of a grand jury investigation.102  In Moffitt, the client approached the 
firm for representation after the grand jury had begun investigating and after 
some of his personal and business assets had been seized.103  The firm asked 
that the client pay a large portion of its fees upfront, totaling more than 
$100,000.104  The client paid $17,000 with a wad of bills fished from his 
pocket and, the following day, paid the remaining funds with cash stored in 
a cracker box or a shoe box.105  The firm did not ask the client where the 
money came from but did tell the client that it would not accept “funny 
money.”106  The client refused a receipt for both payments out of fear that the 
FBI might find it.107 
 
 99. Barry Tarlow, RICO Report:  Five Important Words on Fee Forfeiture:  Getting It Up 
Front & Getting It in the End, CHAMPION, May 2004, at 61.  The Rhode Island District Court 
has also recognized that the indictment standard makes little sense, noting that when “an 
indictment is based solely on evidence presented by the government which a defendant has no 
opportunity to challenge, an indictment, alone, is not a sufficient ground for inferring 
reasonable cause for the defendant’s attorney to believe that the defendant probably will be 
convicted.” United States v. Saccoccia, 165 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.R.I. 2001).  This inference 
“would deny virtually every defendant accused of an offense carrying a forfeiture penalty of 
the right to counsel of his or her choice because the risk of not being paid would deter most 
attorneys from accepting such cases.” Id.  Accordingly, the court allowed the petitioning 
attorneys to keep all fees collected prior to the conviction of their clients. Id. 
 100. Tarlow, supra note 99, at 61.  
 101. 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 102. Id. at 665–66.  
 103. Id. at 663. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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After receipt of the retainer, the law firm met with the prosecutors in the 
case.108  During these meetings, the government described the strength of its 
case against the client and disclosed the fact that assets were already 
seized.109  The government also shared an affidavit prepared by an IRS 
investigator that supported search and seizure warrants executed against the 
client.110  The affidavit reported that the volume of the client’s spending and 
saving was so vast that it could only have come from drug trafficking.111  The 
affidavit also revealed that the client used his businesses to facilitate drug 
sales and to launder drug profits.112  The client was indicted soon after this 
meeting and the government sought forfeiture of all funds paid to the firm.113 
Ultimately, the court ordered that the firm forfeit the entire fee.114  In 
making this determination, the court noted that “the lawyers did not seek to 
obviate doubts that any person would have had about the source of [the 
client’s] substantial cash payment.  The meetings, in fact, create the 
impression that the participants were engaging in some sort of wink and nod 
ritual whereby they agreed not to ask—or tell—too much.”115 
Thus, the Moffitt court created a duty for attorneys to conduct an 
investigation of fee payments to satisfy the “reasonable without cause” 
provision.116  The district court held that attorneys, when confronted with 
clients with potentially tainted assets, should first inform prospective clients 
that they cannot pay fees with proceeds from crimes and that such proceeds 
are subject to forfeiture, even in attorneys’ hands.117  Should the client 
answer “that the money comes from legitimate sources, attorneys should take 
whatever further steps or ask whatever further questions may be suggested 
by the circumstances to satisfy themselves that it is objectively reasonable to 
believe the answer.”118 
The Fourth Circuit did not, however, provide a clear answer to how much 
investigation needs to be done.  Instead, the court required that attorneys “ask 
sufficient direct questions and take whatever further steps the client’s 
answers might indicate to ensure that a belief that the funds are legitimate is 
objectively reasonable.”119  The court added that “[n]o precise formula exists 
to define the appropriate inquiry in all circumstances.  Each situation may be 
different.”120 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 663–64.  
 114. Id. at 664.  
 115. Id. at 666.  
 116. See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Va. 1994), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.; cf. Moffitt, 83 F.3d 660. 
 120. Id.; cf. Moffitt, 83 F.3d 660. 
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Similarly, in United States v. McCorkle,121 the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida held that the defendant’s attorney, F. Lee 
Bailey,122 could not claim the bona fide purchaser protection where (1) he 
knew that the federal and state governments suspected that his clients were 
leaders of a major infomercial fraud scheme, (2) the government had seized 
nearly all of his clients’ personal and business assets based on a judicial 
officer’s finding of probable cause to believe that the assets were subject to 
forfeiture, and (3) the government actively sought forfeiture of the laundered 
fraud proceeds through criminal indictment and forfeiture actions.123  The 
court held that Bailey learned, or should have learned, all of this information 
in his own investigation.124 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have imposed a similar affirmative duty of 
investigation on criminal defense attorneys.  In F.T.C. v. Assail, Inc.,125 the 
Fifth Circuit held that if an attorney has been paid with tainted funds and 
wishes to retain them, “he must demonstrate that he conducted an inquiry 
sufficient to allow him to be ‘reasonably without cause to believe that the 
property was subject to forfeiture.’”126  Additionally, the attorney “has a duty 
to make a good faith inquiry into the source of [her] fees.”127  Punishment 
for failure to meet this duty is disgorgement of the funds.128 
In F.T.C. v. Network Services Depot, Inc.,129 the Ninth Circuit, citing 
Assail, held that “an attorney is not permitted to be willfully ignorant of how 
his fees are paid” and imposed a duty on defense attorneys to conduct an 
“objectively reasonable and diligent inquiry” into their clients’ assets.130  
Thus, not only do attorneys have a duty to read their clients’ indictments but 
they have a legal duty to conduct an investigation into their clients’ funds 
before beginning their representation. 
In sum, § 853(n)(6)(B) and subsequent case law provide that earned fees 
are subject to forfeiture if the fees were in fact tainted, and the lawyer 
reasonably should have known that, at the time she accepted the fees, they 
were or probably were tainted.  The lawyer may be put on notice (1) by the 
government through disclosure of an indictment or arrest, a pending grand 
jury investigation, or its evidence against the client; (2) by the manner in 
which the fee was paid; or (3) by other facts.  When there are red flags, the 
lawyer has a duty to investigate the cleanliness of the funds.  
 
 121. No. 6:98-CR-52-ORL-19C, 2000 WL 133759 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2000), aff’d, 321 
F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 122. F. Lee Bailey may have a knack for forfeiting his fees.  Another court denied Bailey’s 
petition because he read the indictment and therefore knew the government was seeking 
forfeiture of the property listed in the forfeiture allegation. Bailey v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 
459, 478 (2002), aff’d, 94 F. App’x 828 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 123. McCorkle, 2000 WL 133759, at *33. 
 124. Id. at *8–14. 
 125. 410 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 126. Id. at 265 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (2012)). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. 617 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 130. Id. at 1144. 
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II.  LEGAL ETHICS AND ASSET FORFEITURE LAW:  
THE ZERO-SUM GAME AT PLAY 
Returning to the hypothetical presented in the Introduction, imagine a 
client has come into an attorney’s office to notify the attorney that he is being 
investigated for insider trading.  The client has not yet been indicted,131 but 
the government has issued subpoenas to the client’s employer regarding a 
specific trade the client performed.  There is no doubt that the client profited 
from this specific trade.  The government’s investigation is aimed at 
determining whether the trade was made with scienter because insider trading 
is a mens rea crime.132  Other white collar crimes that require proof of mens 
rea include bankruptcy fraud,133 mail fraud,134 wire fraud,135 bank fraud,136 
health care fraud,137 and securities fraud.138  For each of these crimes, the 
government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit 
the criminal act. 
When representing a white collar defendant charged with a mens rea crime, 
the defense attorney must begin an investigation.  Due to the nature of the 
crime, the defense attorney often does not need to investigate the act itself 
but must investigate the state of mind of the client when he committed the 
act.139  Such an investigation is more complicated than a normal fact-finding 
investigation because it involves getting inside the client’s mind.140 
To be a zealous advocate, the attorney must immediately ensure that the 
government cannot gather enough evidence to indict the client.141  The 
attorney must also prepare an alternate theory of the case, in the event that 
the government is able to bring an indictment against the client.  The attorney 
often employs her own expert accounting and financial investigators and a 
staff of legal researchers.142 
In asset forfeiture cases like insider trading,143 the attorney’s investigation 
must accomplish at least two goals.  The first goal is to create a theory of the 
 
 131. In the realm of white collar criminal defense, most of the attorney’s work comes at the 
preindictment stage. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME:  A PORTRAIT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 9 (1985); Tarlow, supra note 99, at 61. 
 132. See supra note 7. 
 133. See 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 137. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012). 
 138. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012). 
 139. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 140. See Chad S.C. Stover, Best Practices in Proving Specific Intent and Malice.  What 
Can Civil and Criminal Litigators Learn from One Another?, A.B.A. SEC. ANN. CONF. 1 (Apr. 
9, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/ 
2014_sac/2014_sac/best_practices.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKY8-DX3P] 
(“Proving intent in either the civil or criminal context is inherently difficult.  The attorney 
must attempt to prove (or disprove) what was going on in a person’s . . . mind when 
performing an action or course of conduct.”). 
 141. See MANN, supra note 131, at 5 (“[A]bove all . . . the defense attorney works to keep 
potential evidence out of government reach by controlling access to information.”).  
 142. Id.  
 143. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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case to zealously advocate on behalf of the client.  The second goal is to 
investigate whether the money used to pay the attorney’s fees is tainted.  To 
claim the reasonable lack of knowledge standard under § 853(n)(6)(B), the 
attorney must ask the client “sufficient direct questions and take whatever 
further steps the client’s answers might indicate to ensure that a belief that 
the funds are legitimate is objectively reasonable.”144 
These two investigations are in direct conflict.  If the attorney 
accomplishes only the first goal of creating an alternate theory of the case, 
the attorney will lose out on her fees by failing to fulfill her investigative 
duties under Moffitt, as the punishment for failure to conduct a Moffitt 
investigation is disgorgement.145  If the attorney accomplishes only the 
second goal of establishing a reasonable lack of knowledge, the attorney will 
not be able to zealously represent her client, which would leave her subject 
to discipline.146  If the attorney attempts to accomplish both goals, she may 
be asking questions and performing fact investigations that do not align with 
the best ways to represent her client.147 
This scenario raises other ethical questions.  First, what options does the 
attorney have if or when she loses her bona fide purchaser status?  Can she 
withdraw from the case and keep the fees she was paid prior to losing out on 
claiming this exception?  What can she reveal to the judge in her motion to 
withdraw?  Second, if she decides to stay on the case, can she use any 
information obtained in her Moffitt investigation in her ancillary hearing 
under § 853(n)?  At what point does the attorney violate her duty to maintain 
client confidences?  This Note examines these questions. 
Part II.A examines the ethical issues that arise from the conflict between 
the fact investigation and the Moffitt investigation.  Part II.B discusses the 
attorney’s right to withdraw from the case if and when she can no longer 
show a reasonable belief that the property was not subject to forfeiture.  It 
also analyzes what she can reveal in her motion to withdraw.  Finally, Part 
II.C considers what information, if any, from an attorney’s Moffitt 
investigation can be used at the ancillary hearing. 
A.  The Overlapping Investigation 
Upon being retained by the client, the defense attorney must conduct two 
simultaneous investigations:  a fact-finding investigation and a Moffitt 
investigation.  This Part demonstrates that these two investigations have 
competing goals, and this competition is to the detriment of both the client 
and the attorney. 
 
 144. In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 145. See F.T.C. v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that “when an 
attorney is objectively on notice that [her] fees may derive from a pool of frozen assets, [she] 
has a duty to make a good faith inquiry into the source of those fees” and the failure to make 
such an inquiry will result in disgorgement of her fees). 
 146. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 147. See infra Part II.A. 
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In his book Defending White-Collar Crime:  A Portrait of Attorneys at 
Work, white collar defense attorney Kenneth Mann lays out the ways in 
which attorneys conduct factual investigations.148  He notes that there are two 
possible goals related to these investigations:  first, to obtain adequate 
information about the situation being investigated, and second, to keep the 
client from communicating information to the attorney that would interfere 
with her building a strong defense.149  “Some attorneys, for instance, 
discourage the disclosure of facts that would negate a defense of lack of 
knowledge.”150  They also seek to prevent the client from providing 
information that would indicate that the client “actually had knowledge of a 
fact that would prove criminal intent.”151  A smart attorney does not say to 
her client, “I don’t really want to know if you saw the document, let’s talk 
around that.”152  Instead, Mann notes, attorneys employ refined techniques 
to put themselves in the best tactical position without violating any moral or 
ethical standards.153 
Mann refers to these techniques as “[a]voidance [t]echniques.”154  The 
most common avoidance technique is simply not to inquire.155  The benefit 
of this ignorance is that the attorney has more leeway with the types of 
defenses she presents.156 
To demonstrate avoidance techniques, Mann presents a scenario that is 
useful for understanding the zero-sum nature of asset forfeiture and 
attorney’s fees.157  A client hired a law firm after being investigated for price 
fixing.  The evidence indicates that the price fixing was a one-time event 
resulting from pressure applied by a superior, who had since left the 
corporation.  The attorneys hoped to convince the prosecutor to exercise his 
discretion not to indict the client by arguing that his former superior subjected 
him to irresistible duress.  However, just before the meeting with the 
prosecutor, the client disclosed to the attorneys that he had begun to make 
similar price-fixing agreements. 
 
 148. See MANN, supra note 131, at 103.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 104.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 103.  While some may question the ethics of avoidance techniques, they are 
well within the rights and duties of a criminal defense attorney.  The role of the criminal 
defense attorney is threefold:  (1) ensuring that the criminal justice system produces just results 
by acting as an aggressive advocate in the adversary system, (2) forcing the government to 
satisfy its burden of proof, and (3) serving as a monitor against government overreach. See 
Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 173 (1997).  
Criminal defense attorneys who employ these avoidance techniques view them as “essential 
to their own sense of the proper role of the defense attorney in the adversary system and of the 
ethical and moral standards that govern the legal profession in the context of a criminal 
investigation.” MANN, supra note 131, at 104.  For more on the ethical considerations of 
criminal defense attorneys, see generally Joshua A. Liebman, Note, Dishonest Ethical 
Advocacy?:  False Defenses in Criminal Court, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (2016). 
 157. See MANN, supra note 131, at 105–06.  
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Upon learning this information, the attorneys could no longer ethically 
present the argument that the client was subject to duress.  Instead, they had 
to shift course and argue the weaker point that price fixing occurred because 
of pressure applied by the superior, not that price fixing was a one-time 
occurrence.158  An attorney can only zealously represent her client within the 
confines of the law.159  Thus, anytime a client overdiscloses, the attorney’s 
ability to zealously represent the client is greatly diminished. 
Asset forfeiture law imposes a duty on the attorney to obtain information 
that she would rather not have the client disclose.160  The attorney is required 
to tell the client that she cannot accept funds stemming from any illegal 
sources or crimes.161  If the client tells the attorney that the funds are not 
tainted, the attorney then must “ask sufficient direct questions and take 
whatever further steps the client’s answers might indicate to ensure that a 
belief that the funds are legitimate is objectively reasonable.”162  If the 
attorney fails to make such an inquiry, her legal fees will be disgorged.163 
The law impedes the attorney’s ability to zealously represent her client.  
Instead of allowing the attorney to engage in avoidance techniques, the law 
imposes a duty on the attorney to verify that the funds are not tainted.164  This 
requires asking the questions the attorney would prefer not to ask.  
Accordingly, the attorney’s ability to raise different defenses is limited—
pushing the attorney to the negotiating table instead of avoiding indictment. 
This scenario creates a zero-sum game for the attorney and the client.  The 
client loses out zealous representation by greatly limiting the potential 
theories and arguments the attorney can make on his behalf.  The attorney 
loses out on her ability to claim the bona fide purchaser exemption by forcing 
the attorney to ask questions designed to eliminate her reasonable lack of 
knowledge as to whether the funds are tainted. 
The Moffitt investigation requires that the attorney take steps to determine 
whether or not funds are tainted.165  Courts have not defined when the Moffit 
duty arises, but the investigation is necessary to retain attorney’s fees.166  
Thus, it is likely that the attorney will conduct the investigation early in the 
representation to avoid rendering services without the prospect of 
compensation.  If the Moffitt investigation leads an attorney to believe that 
she will not be able to collect legal fees, it is likely that she will attempt to 
withdraw from the case. 
 
 158. Id. at 106.  
 159. See supra Part I.A.1.  
 160. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 161. See In re Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 846 F. Supp. 463, 474 (E.D. Va. 1994), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See F.T.C. v. Assail, Inc., 410 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 164. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 165. See In re Moffit, 846 F. Supp. at 474. 
 166. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
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B.  The Right to Withdraw 
An attorney does not have a duty to see a case to its natural end.  The 
attorney may file a motion to withdraw as counsel if she so chooses.167  But 
the decision to grant a motion to withdraw is within the judge’s discretion.168  
This decision often rests on a finding of “good cause,”169 but determining 
what constitutes good cause “is not so readily stated.”170 
Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct allow for permissive withdrawal in certain 
situations.  Under the Code, an attorney may withdraw where the client: 
(a) [i]nsists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under 
existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (b) [p]ersonally seeks 
to pursue an illegal course of conduct; (c) [i]nsists that the lawyer pursue a 
course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary 
Rules; (d) [b]y other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the 
lawyer to carry out his employment effectively; (e) [i]nsists, in a matter not 
pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary 
to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the 
Disciplinary Rules; (f) [d]eliberately disregards an agreement or obligation 
to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.171 
Additionally, the Code allows for permissive withdrawal where the 
attorney’s continued employment would result in a violation of a disciplinary 
rule,172 where the attorney cannot work with cocounsel,173 where the attorney 
faces mental or physical hardship making effective representation 
difficult,174 or if the client freely assents.175  Under the Code, therefore, an 
attorney seeking withdrawal for losing her bona fide purchaser exemption 
has no grounds for permissive withdrawal. 
By contrast, the Model Rules allow for permissive withdrawal if “the 
representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer 
or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client.”176  However, many 
courts have found that “the nonpayment of fees is usually not a sufficient 
basis, standing alone, to override the attorney’s ethical responsibilities of 
continued representation of a client.”177  While the nonpayment of fees does 
 
 167. See Cordi-Allen v. Halloran, 470 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[T]he baseline attorney-
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 168. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer must 
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 169. See Slater, supra note 30, at 1438.  
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 171. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 172. Id. DR 2-110(C)(2). 
 173. Id. DR 2-110(C)(3). 
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not stem from the client’s inability to pay, courts likely would be reluctant to 
allow an attorney to withdraw as counsel for fee purposes alone.178 
Furthermore, an attorney cannot withdraw because the attorney knows her 
client is guilty.  As Justice John Paul Stevens explained: 
That a defense lawyer may be convinced before trial that any defense is 
wholly frivolous does not qualify his or her duty to the client or to the 
court . . . the stigma of guilt may not attach to the client until the 
presumption of innocence has been overcome by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.179 
Accordingly, even if the attorney was able to demonstrate an “unreasonable 
financial burden”180 by the loss of the “reasonable without cause to believe” 
exception,181 the financial burden would hinge on the attorney’s knowledge 
of the client’s guilt. 
To withdraw as counsel, the attorney generally must divulge to the court 
the reasons for withdrawal.182  Here, the attorney would be forced to admit 
to the court that she has learned that the client’s funds are tainted.  This would 
clearly violate the attorney’s duties to maintain client confidences and adhere 
to the duty of loyalty.183  Additionally, the client would lose his presumption 
of innocence in the eyes of the court. 
Thus, an attorney who learns that her fees are tainted must decide whether 
she can withdraw from the case and what information she can reveal in her 
motion to withdraw.  Under McCorkle, the attorney is entitled to a pro rata 
percentage of her fees; she can only collect the fees up until she loses her 
bona fide purchaser status.184  The attorney then has no reason to continue 
representing her client because she is unlikely to recoup her fees.  It is in her 
best interest to withdraw as counsel. 
Seemingly, the attorney does not have the option to withdraw as counsel 
upon learning that the fees are tainted.  Instead, the attorney must continue to 
zealously represent her client until the government convicts the client, 
negotiates a plea, or drops the investigation.  This puts the attorney in an 
incredibly difficult position.  Now that she knows the fees likely are tainted, 
the bona fide purchaser exception ceases to apply and she must forfeit all 
future payments.  Knowledge of this possibility may influence the advice she 
gives her client.  She may, for example, encourage him to negotiate a plea 
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deal rather than exercise his right to a jury trial because doing so will lead to 
an earlier conclusion of the case, reducing the attorney’s uncompensated 
costs and services. 
If the court does not permit the attorney to withdraw as counsel,185 the 
attorney faces yet another ethical conundrum.  Upon withdrawal, an attorney 
normally provides replacement counsel with her files and folders.186  These 
files likely contain evidence pointing to the uncleanliness of the funds.  
Immediately upon review, replacement counsel will have lost his bona fide 
purchaser exemption and all fees from that point on will be subject to 
forfeiture.  This then incentivizes the replacement attorney to withdraw as 
counsel.  Under this cycle, the client has no opportunity to obtain counsel of 
his choosing.187 
If the original attorney decides not to provide all of her findings, the 
replacement attorney must start from square one, further disadvantaging the 
client.188  The white collar defense attorney’s advantage is in the control of 
information.189  The longer the government has to develop its case, the more 
likely it is that the client will be indicted.190  If the replacement attorney has 
to start his fact and Moffit investigations anew, then the Government has a 
greater chance of advancing its case to the indictment stage. 
Regardless of whether the attorney can withdraw from the case after losing 
the bona fide purchaser exemption, the attorney and the client both suffer.  
The attorney potentially surrenders her fees for services rendered after losing 
the bona fide purchaser protection.  The client, meanwhile, loses his ability 
to obtain the counsel of his choosing, and he is more likely to be indicted. 
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C.  The Ancillary Hearing 
Once an attorney’s factual and Moffitt investigations are complete, and the 
attorney, because of the rules of withdrawal, remains on the case, she must 
decide what to reveal in her motion for an ancillary hearing to retain fees.  
Assuming that the client has been convicted, the government will bring an 
asset forfeiture proceeding.191  The attorney will then have one last chance to 
hold onto her fees by petitioning for an ancillary hearing.192  At the hearing, 
the attorney may testify, present evidence and witnesses on her own behalf, 
and cross-examine witnesses.193  The government has the same rights to 
support its claim to the property.194  The attorney carries the burden of proof 
and must establish her legal interest in the property by a preponderance of 
the evidence.195 
The question that remains is what evidence the attorney is entitled to 
present.  In her Moffitt investigation, the attorney asked her client a series of 
questions to determine whether or not the funds used to pay her fees were 
tainted.196  The client, knowing that the attorney would rather not know 
definitively if her client was guilty,197 lied about the cleanliness of the funds.  
Is the attorney entitled to present this lie as evidence?  Even assuming the 
client told the truth about the cleanliness of the funds, can the attorney present 
that as evidence? 
These inquiries stem from the attorney’s duty to keep client confidences.  
To zealously represent her client, an attorney and her client must be able to 
have privileged conversations.198  This privilege protects all communications 
“relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks 
legal assistance.”199  If the attorney were to violate this privilege, she could 
face disciplinary action, including disbarment.200  But the attorney cannot 
prove her bona fide purchaser status without disclosing this information.  The 
attorney is put in a legal and ethical bind.  To protect her fees, she must 
violate the attorney-client privilege, but she could face disbarment or other 
disciplinary action for doing so. 
The Department of Justice recognizes that this is an ethical conundrum.  In 
the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, the Department of Justice lays out guidelines 
defense attorneys can follow to protect their fees.201  The guidelines 
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recognize that “the need for clients to make full and free disclosure to their 
attorneys outweighs the detriment of placing limitation on the use of some 
non-privileged communications in certain limited situations.”202  They also 
note that “knowledge of the forfeitability of an asset . . . cannot be 
established by compelled disclosure of confidential communications made 
during the course of the representation.”203  But this means that the 
government cannot compel the attorney to break this privilege—instead, the 
attorney must voluntarily break her privilege in order to keep her fees. 
In sum, the attorney has a personal interest in keeping her fees, but she also 
has a duty to maintain client confidences.  The ancillary hearing puts the 
attorney in a bind:  get paid or face disciplinary action. 
III.  THE STATUTORY FIX 
This Part proposes a statutory fix to ethical dilemmas arising from asset 
forfeiture, ensuring that an attorney can retain her fees while avoiding 
disciplinary action.  Like asset forfeiture law,204 money laundering statutes 
expanded greatly in the 1980s.205  In an effort to stem the flow of drugs in 
the United States, Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986 (MLCA).206  The goal was to “cut[] off the avenues by which dealers 
could legitimize and spend their money [and] reduce the incentive to import 
and sell drugs.”207  Congress again turned its focus to money laundering 
following the attacks on September 11, 2001, when it discovered that Al 
Qaeda used laundered money to finance its attacks.208 
The main tooth of the MLCA is 18 U.S.C. § 1957.209  This statute 
criminalizes monetary transactions in criminally derived property that is of a 
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.210  
The statute also notes that “[i]n a prosecution for an offense under this 
section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the 
offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was 
specified unlawful activity.”211 
In response to MLCA’s enactment, the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers (NACDL) lobbied Congress for greater protections for 
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defense attorneys.212  They argued that “defense lawyers would occasionally 
know that their fees were being paid from ill-gotten gains” and that if “legal 
fees were not restrained, clients would not receive adequate representation 
and our legal system would be the loser.”213  Based in part on these 
arguments, Congress became afraid that criminal defense attorneys could be 
imprisoned for money laundering simply for doing their jobs.214 
In 1988, Congress recognized the need to protect criminal defense 
attorneys’ fees and prevent disciplinary action that may arise in the pursuit 
of those fees when the attorney acts legally and rationally.  It amended the 
MCLA to exempt any transaction reasonably necessary “to preserve a 
person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”215  The amendment redefined “monetary transaction”216 to 
“not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to 
representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.”217  
This provided greater protection for defense attorneys by not limiting the 
exemption to payment of attorneys’ fees, to payments made by the accused 
personally, or to payments made in connection with a pending criminal 
case.218  The amendment has been routinely used to prevent the conviction 
of reasonable and hard-working criminal defense attorneys.219 
Similarly, Congress should amend the asset forfeiture statutes to provide 
an exemption for legal fees.  A statutory fix is the only practical solution to 
the ethical problems that arise when representing a client facing asset 
forfeiture.  In the investigation stage, an attorney would not be forced to 
conduct an investigation that undercuts her ability to zealously represent her 
client, a duty that has been recognized since the early nineteenth century.220  
Next, the attorney would not be inclined to withdraw from her client’s case 
because she would be assured payment for services rendered would not be 
subject to forfeiture.  The client, in turn, would maintain his right to the 
counsel of his choosing.  Finally, the attorney would no longer be required to 
petition for an ancillary hearing.  This would ensure that she does not 
purposefully violate attorney-client confidentiality or attorney-client 
privilege.  A statutory fix like the MCLA amendment would prevent the 
criminal defense bar from violating their duties to clients.  It would also fulfill 
the client’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.221 
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CONCLUSION 
The asset forfeiture statutory scheme is a confusing and convoluted means 
of ensuring that a criminal defendant does not receive any benefit from the 
commission of a crime.  However, federal asset forfeiture laws currently put 
criminal defense attorneys in a zero-sum position; they must violate their 
duty to zealously represent their client, and they are forced to represent their 
clients for free or face disciplinary action and disgorgement of any paid 
funds.  Congress must step in and amend 18 U.S.C. § 853 to exempt 
attorneys’ fees from the threat of asset forfeiture.  Only then can criminal 
defense attorneys provide their clients with an adequate defense. 
 
